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Abstract 
 
I investigate the origins of social trust within Vietnam. Combining a unique contemporary survey 
of households with historical data on climate variation, I show that individuals who are heavily 
threatened by negative climate fluctuation exhibit more trust in neighbors and other people in 
close group. The evidence indicates that the effects of climate variation on social trust are 
transmitted through strengthening the cooperation among village peasants in coping with risk 
and uncertainty. The results also indicate that households with higher proportion of agricultural 
incomes tend to rely more on village members in the case of emergency. However, the increased 
village relationship does not erode family ties.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The past decade has seen a rapidly increasing consensus among economists that institutions is 
one of the most important sources of economic growth and holds the key to prevailing patterns of 
prosperity around the world
1
. Along with expanding research on formal institutions, economists 
also pay more attention on the role of informal institutions and its interaction with formal 
institutions as key determinants contributing to economic development (Jutting et al, 2007; 
Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Substantial studies have found that informal institutions, such as 
social trust, play crucial roles on economic and institutional development through its facilitation 
of cooperation, network connections, mutual monitoring among the members of a community
2
.  
 
However, far too little attention has been paid to find out the origin of social trust. Only recently 
some studies have begun to investigate the source of social trust and to explain the large 
differences in trust across and within countries. Several studies have revealed that historical 
circumstances, particularly experiences of cooperation or conflict such as the free-city state 
experience in medieval Italy, the missionary activities and slave trade in Africa, can have long 
lasting effects on the level of trust of a community (Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2008; Nunn, 
2010; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).  
 
In another interesting paper, Durante (2009) examines the long term impacts of climate volatility 
on social trust and showing that historical variability in climatic conditions affects the evolution 
of trust and family ties in Europe. He finds that norms of trust developed as a result of collective 
action and mutual insurance resulted from farmers coping with dramatic climate variation. 
 While most of these regions have now become industrialized, these medieval norms still exist.  
 
Although this cross-country study is suggestive and stimulating, it may provide limited evidence 
of causal effects since too many things alter across countries (Alesina, 2010). In addition, it is 
                                                          
1
 See for example Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Alesina et al., 1996; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Rodirk, 2000a; Rodrik, 2000b; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Easterly 
and Levine, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999, 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu, 2009. 
2 Some influential studies include Knack, 2002; Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and 
Knack, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004, 2006; Tabellini, 2010. 
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difficult to exclude the possibility of other factors, such as religion, ethnicity or geography of the 
region, may relate to both changing in the social trust and climate variables, especially, for long 
time period and then bias the results
3
. Therefore, investigation within country to see how 
different individuals behave, by holding the other characteristics and institutions of a country 
constant, can provide a good comparison and supplement for cross-country studies. 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to complement recent studies that try to understand and 
explain trust origins. Particularly, the paper tries to fill gaps in our knowledge of origins of social 
trust in the context of developing and non-Western societies. Specifically, I examine empirical 
relationships between climate variation and social capital in the context of Vietnam. Vietnam 
offers an attractive setting to study social trust. Unlike many other developing countries and 
transitional economies, Vietnam has experienced exceptional per capita income growth in the 
last two decades, accompanied by fundamental but gradual social changes without large-scale 
social or political upheavals. However, the high economic growth cannot explain by the quality 
of formal institutions as Vietnam is ranked at low level in international ranking tables such as 
Polity IV and Governance Indicator. One explanation is weak formal institutions are likely to be 
supplemented by informal institutions. For instance, the World Value Surveys show that the 
Vietnamese national level of social trust appears higher than some other East Asian nations at 
Vietnam's stage of economic development (Dalton and Ngoc, 2005).  
 
I try to examine empirically the hypothesis that development of trust is based on the demand of 
cooperation between peasants to cope with natural climate
4
 fluctuations, which are considered as 
the main risks for agricultural activities (Durante, 2009; Tran, 1997; Rambo, 1979). Durante 
(2009) proposes that peasants in rural and remote regions, in which well-functioning credit and 
insurance markets do not exit, have to rely on different strategies to protect themselves from 
natural shocks. Of which, some strategies are only effective if there are some degree of collective 
                                                          
3
 It is also difficult to control for movement of people around and migration into Europe, particularly over several 
hundred years. 
4 According to World Meteorological Organization, climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as “average 
weather” and more rigorously “can be defined as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of 
relevant quantities over a period of time, ranging from months to thousands or millions years”. 
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effort and involvements of the broader community. For example, as large-scale constructions 
have to be built to ease the impacts of hazard environment, they require cooperative action 
among members of the local community. In addition, peasants can improve insurance capacity 
against natural risks by expanding relationship to other member in same communes, who are 
likely to be affected by weather fluctuations in the same ways. 
 
To test our hypothesis, I use data from 2008 Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey to 
investigate whether households living in regions that were heavily affected by climate variability 
in the past are more trusting others people today.  Through combining historical climate data for 
the period 1927-1985 with a contemporary survey data on social capital available from different 
provinces across the country, the analysis confirms that regions with greater intra-annual 
fluctuations in temperature and rainfall have higher levels of interpersonal trust among village 
peasants. This study also indicate that although some can argue that other factors, such as 
genetics or education, play a much larger role in the development of culture, the relationship of 
climate variability and social trust in Vietnam can no longer be ignored. In other words, 
Vietnam‟s natural climate variation has played a crucial role in the development of Vietnamese 
agricultural culture and will continue to influence Vietnam‟s in the future.  
 
I also examine whether a more variable environment should increase an individual‟s propensity 
to interact with non-family members and reduce her dependency on the family for insurance 
purposes. If it does, then higher climate variability may make family ties weaker. Numerous 
studies have attempted to explain the existence of a negative relationship between social trust 
and the strength of family ties: the greater the importance of the family to the individual, the less 
their sense of community and civic engagement (for example, Banfield, 1958; Ermisch and 
Gambetta, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Durante, 2009).  
 
Contrary to other studies, such as Durante (2009), the results indicate that more variability in 
rainfall and temperature does not weaken family ties in regions. One explanation is that in a 
Confucian country people consider families as the most important factors and this perception is 
persistent. Therefore, this norm is expected to be maintained even people receive less support 
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from their relatives. Another alternative explanation for my finding is that family ties and general 
trust are not necessarily substituted but rather unrelated (or complemented) in Confucian 
countries.  
 
I then turned to specific mechanisms and examined two explanations for the relationship 
between the climate variation and trust. I found that people living in more climate variation tend 
to ask for the help from their neighbors in the case of emergency, which enhance mutual trust 
among them. In addition, I realized that households who rely more on agricultural incomes tend 
to trust other people. One possible interpretation is that the living that heavily relies on natural 
environment resulted in continuing cooperation and promoting social networks, and higher trust 
 
The paper has been organized in the following way. I begin in section 2 by describing historical 
background, discussing evidence on the interaction between natural environment and 
cooperation. In this section, I also illustrate the conceptual framework and its predictions. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy and presents the results 
obtained using historical climate data. Finally, section 5 summarizes the key findings and 
concludes. 
 
2. Environmental Adaptation, Cooperation and Trust in Rural Regions of Vietnam 
 
A. Historical Background 
 
Vietnam lies between roughly eight and twenty-three degrees north latitudes, which places it 
within the tropical monsoon belt. Due to differences in latitude and uneven topography, 
Vietnam‟s climate conditions are far from uniform with two distinct climatic zones, North and 
South Vietnam (Mark and Nguyen, 2001).  North of Vietnam encompasses the mountainous 
provinces, Red River Delta and a part of central regions of the country. Gourou (1936) divided 
the Red River Delta into eight sub-regions, three of which are the foothills marginal to the plain 
and five of which are within the Delta. Each of these sub-regions represents a variety of relief 
and drainage. The quality of soil is low and varies in structure and type across the region and 
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even from village to village. In addition, the Red River Delta is also exposed to high risk of 
being flooded. The coastal central regions can experience heavier rainfall than other areas 
because of typhoons that develop in the East Sea and move northeast along the coast. The 
typhoons are generally worse along the southern coast, which experiences the most severe winds 
and heaviest rainfall. Vietnam‟s typhoons are most common in July through October. Large 
portions of the coast can experience heavy rainfall throughout the entire year. South climate is 
dominated by dry seasons and wet monsoons and lies in the northern temperate zone; therefore, 
these regions would have been most productive for agriculture purposes. 
 
Being a typical agricultural country, people's lives depend much on natural conditions. Resident 
areas are organized into hamlets and villages. Village people have liked to live in big families. 
Compassion and assistance among people are the representation of kin's strength. In a kin, 
everybody is responsible for protecting and assisting each other both material and spirit, guiding 
each others to promote their position in society. Moreover, since the wet rice cultivation requires 
a big labor force, Vietnamese farmers not only bear much but also assist to each others.  In order 
to cope with the social environment, it is necessary to cooperate to make effect. The organization 
basing on this habitat creates democracy and equality between man and man. This is regarded to 
be primary democratic form - village democracy (Rambo, 1979; 2005). However, there are 
fundamental differences in the characteristics of villages and village peasants between the North 
and South
5
. The differences in natural environment help to explain the diversity of social 
organization between northern and southern peasants. While the environment in Mekong Delta is 
homogonous through its surface, the Red River Delta shows a natural diversification. 
 
The Red River with about 1,200 kilometers long has high water volume, which averages 500 
million cubic meters per second, but may increase by more than 60 times at the peak of the rainy 
season. The entire delta region is no more than three meters above sea level, and much of it is 
one meter or less. Moreover, this delta area is subject to erratic but heavy rainfall (Rambo, 1979). 
Such heavy rains are usually associated with the movement of typhoons in the East Sea and 
                                                          
5
 The southern Vietnamese peasants originated from the north and gradually migrated southward in the process of 
advancing to the south. 
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hence can occur several times throughout years. Consequently, as rainfall is immediately poured 
in the river regime, the red River can rise to flood levels up to dozen times in a single season 
(Dumong, 1935). Under a natural river regime, almost all the Delta would be subject to annual 
flooding and hence would not be usable for rice cultivation (Gourou, 1936). Therefore, large 
scale constructions, such as dykes and irrigation systems, have to be built and maintained to ease 
the impacts of hazard environment and to irrigate the rich rice-growing delta. Each village takes 
its responsibility of the supervision of the dykes within its territory and all village members were 
liable to perform unpaid labor to repair the dykes (Cima, 1987; Rambo, 2005). 
 
The threat of losses of crop to natural disasters and disease contribute to the adaptive values of 
various risk spreading social institutions which characterize Northern peasant society. Village 
communal granaries provide a reserve food supply in case of serious loss. The division of fields 
into tiny plots and the custom of family owning several widely dispersed fields would also tend 
to reduce the risk of a household losing its entire crop to any particular pest or disease.  
 
The northern peasants live in densely settled villages that surrounded by thick bamboo hedges. 
Outsiders were not permitted to stay in the village after nightfall. Villages were largely 
endogamous and in-migration rare. Outsiders who were allowed to settle in a village had to wait 
three generations before becoming full members of the community. Each village was an 
autonomous self-governing community.   
 
Although Southern villages originally share the same form of social organization as their 
northern ancestors, they have evolved their open settlement pattern in the Mekong Delta with its 
much more benign natural and social environment. Contrary to Northern environment, the 
average annual rainfall in Mekong Delta is just adequate to satisfy the requirements for rice 
growing. Unlike the case of Read River Delta, there is relatively little variation from year to year 
in the quantity of rainfall in the South and consequently crops rather suffer there for lack of 
water (Great Britain, 1943). The habitat is essentially benign, offering no major hazard to 
peasant cultivation and thus requiring no corporately organized protective responses such as the 
flood control dykes of the North (Rambo, 2005). Therefore, the peasant settlements in the South 
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are very different from the northern ones. In fact, they are not villages in the conventional senses. 
There is no bamboo hedge to physically define the boundaries of the village, no gate and control 
on entry. Individual households are widely scattered along the banks of the canals that cross the 
delta. Although these settlements are organized by the state into villages and hamlets, these 
administrative units are not true communities. Households often had closer social relations with 
neighbors living directly across canals; even they are actually residents of different villages than 
they did with people living far down the canal in their own village (Rambo, 2005). Southern 
peasant society does not appear to have become adapted to the threat of crop loss at the village 
level of integration although the share cropping system which predominates in the Mekong Delta 
provides a certain amount of protection to the tenant farmers against crop losses, both because it 
is customary for the landowner to reduce rents in the event of a poor harvest (Hendry, 1964). 
 
B. Conceptual Framework 
 
There are several mechanisms that climate variation is likely to impact on trust. The first 
mechanism is that the difficult natural environment creates favorable conditions for cooperation. 
Some authors seek to explain development of trust based on the demand of cooperation between 
peasants to cope with natural weather fluctuations, which are considered as the main risks for 
agricultural activities (Durante, 2009; Tran, 1997; Rambo, 1979). Durante (2009) proposes that 
peasants in rural and remote regions, in which well-functioning credit and insurance markets do 
not exit, have to rely on different strategies to protect themselves from natural shocks. Of which, 
some strategies are only effective if there are some degree of collective effort and involvements 
of the broader community. In addition, as natural shocks happen frequently, peasants increase in 
the perceived probability that a similar event might occur in the future. They can improve 
insurance capacity against natural risks by expanding relationship to other members in same 
communes, who are likely to be affected by weather fluctuations in the same ways
6
. It causes 
people to be more trustworthy (Cassar et al, 2011). In addition, as argued by Alesina and 
LaFerrara (2002), after the disaster, the community has a lower degree of income disparity, then 
trust may increase due to greater equality. 
                                                          
6
 A formal model has been presented in Appendix III 
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Rambo (1979) demonstrates that the peasant society in the high risk environment has evolved a 
series of institutions which serve to reduce individual insecurity by spreading risk-taking over 
group larger than the nuclear family such as extended family, the lineage and the corporate 
community. As village members select to cooperate with other members, it makes them taking 
more risks in trusting other members. As Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) suggest, interacting 
more with other peoples can lead to more “outward exposure”, and improve their ability to trust 
other people by (1) estimating more accurately the probability of trustworthiness; or (2) reading 
the signs of untrustworthiness more precisely. Therefore, peasants cooperate and interact less 
with other people will exhibit a lower level of trust in members in villages. 
 
The other potential channel of trust is from cultural norms. Although natural uncertainty is 
becoming less profound impacts on agricultural activities, the cooperative and trustworthy 
culture is expected to be maintained. A number of recent papers show that trust attitudes, like 
other cultural traits, can persist for surprisingly long periods of time  and are transmitted from 
generation to generation (for example, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Guiso et al., 2008, Tabellini, 
2008; Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007; Nunn, 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). A recent 
study by Guiso et al. (2008) shows that parents can transmit their prior trustworthiness to their 
children. In another cross- and within-country study, Bjørnskov (2007) finds that trust scores are 
remarkably stable over several decades. This view is coherent with empirical findings on the 
existence of a strong correlation in the propensity to trust between parents and children (Katz and 
Rotter, 1969; Dohmen et al., 2008) and between second-generation immigrants and current 
residents of the original country (Guiso et al., 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2007). 
 
3. Data Sources and Description 
 
Social Trust 
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I employ the third round of Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS)
7
 in 2008 
to inspect the impacts of climate volatility on social trust in different parts of the empirical 
analysis.  
 
VARHSs are uniquely representative surveys which are based on interviews of a random sample 
of 3,223 households in rural regions. Of which, 1,364 rural households in 2004 Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS)
8
 have been resurveyed. In addition to the 1,364 
resurveyed VHLSS-2004 households, the survey contains two other main groups of households. 
First, 820 rural households are resurveyed from the 2002 VHLSS in Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang 
Nam and Long An provinces. Second, the sample includes 945 additional households from the 
five provinces covered by the Agricultural and Development Program (ARD-SPS), namely Lao 
Cai, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Dak Lak and Dak Nong. 
 
In total, the survey covers rural areas of 12 provinces in Vietnam, including: Ha Tay, Lao Cai, 
Phu Tho, Dien Bien and Lai Chau in the North; Nghe An in the North central Coast; Quang Nam 
and Khanh Hoa in the South Central Coast; Dak Lak, Dak Nong and Lam Dong in the Central 
Highland and Long An in the Mekong River Delta. The special feature of this survey is that these 
provinces are located in different geographical regions that reflect various climate conditions and 
then nationally representing different living environment. 
 
The survey provides rich information on a broad range of topics, such as rural employment, on- 
and off-farm income generating activities, rural enterprises, property rights, savings, investment, 
insurance and participation in formal and informal social networks. The visual location 
distribution of current respondents has been represented in Figure 1. The summary statistics of 
                                                          
7 The survey data was conducted in 2008 by Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the Ministry 
of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) under the technical support from Department of Economics (DoE) 
at the University of Copenhagen. All rural households in 12 provinces interviewed for the 2004 Vietnam Household 
Living Standards Survey has been resurveyed. The data are publicly available and can be downloaded at: 
http://www.econ.ku.dk/derg/links/vietnam/ 
8
 The VHLSS is a nationally representative, socio-economic survey, carried out biennially by the General Statistics 
Office (GSO). 
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our analysis sample are presented in Table 1. As shown by the Figure 1, a lot respondents live in 
remote and mountainous areas, with about 41 percent of them are minority. 
 
The survey asks two standard questions about self-reported trust. The exact wording of the 
question is as follows: “Please tell me whether in general you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: Most people are generally honest and can be trusted or In this commune 
one has to be careful, there are people you cannot trust?”  Respondents could either agree or 
disagree. They also had the option of answering that they “do not know”. Removing respondents 
with no answer leaves us with 2939 and 2503 potential observations for the two questions. 
 
Since respondents‟ answers to the trust questions are binary, there are a number of possible 
estimation strategies. The first is constructing a measure of trust that takes on the binary value of 
0 and 1: 0 corresponds to the response “Disagree”; and 1 to the response “Agree” then using 
OLS to estimate linear probability model. Another strategy is to instead estimate a logit model. 
As shown in Appendix, the estimates are qualitatively identical if I pursue this alternative 
strategy. 
 
People suspect that this kind of question is unlikely to capture individual trust attitudes (Durante, 
2009). For example, some have argued that these questions are relatively ambiguous in that they 
do not explicitly specify the object of the respondent‟s trust. Moreover, these questions do not 
provide an exact answer whether this is generalized or particularized trust. 
 
Particularized trust refers to those cases in which individuals trust members of a narrow circle of 
family members or close friends, but do not trust (and do not expect to be trusted by) people 
outside of it. In contrast, generalized trust is the trust that a given person has toward a member of 
a broader community. These questions basically ask about generalized trust. However, since a lot 
people in same village or commune have close relationship, such as kin or relatives, respondents 
are likely to apply instead to particular trust. Therefore, this dataset is likely to reflect the impacts 
of climate adaptation on trust among village members (or particular trust). 
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The distributions of responses for question on social trust are summarized in Table 4
9
. A number 
of characteristics of the responses are notable. The share of respondents who agree with the 
statement "most people are generally honest and can be trusted” is more than 90 percent. The 
results are consistent with those reported in Dalton et. al. (2002), which show that the 
Vietnamese exhibit high levels of trust, compared with other countries surveyed under the World 
Values Survey project. 
 
Family and Village Ties 
 
The importance of family is a historical aspect of Vietnamese society, as with many Confucian 
societies in East Asia. The family is a basis of economic organization in an agrarian economy, 
the role of the father and parents in general is reinforced by cultural traditions, and family 
relations provide a general model for authority relations (Pham, 1999). Through history and 
changes in political and social regimes, the centrality of the family appears to be an enduring 
feature of Vietnamese society (Dalton et al, 2003). 
 
To investigate the impact of climate variation on family ties, I use information about households 
who reported having helpers. The survey asks respondents to provide information about people 
who are a source of help in case of emergency. People can list the name of up to three people 
from whom they asked for a help. The exact question is “If you were in need of money in case of 
an emergency who outside of your household could you turn to, who would be willing to provide 
this assistance?” In addition, the survey includes another question about how relationship of 
these people with household: (1) Relative; (2) Friend; (3) Neighbor; or (4) Other. The survey 
also provides information whether these people in the same village or not. 
 
I classify whether household mainly asking for help from relatives rather others (friend and 
neighbors) if all people in the asking lists are relatives. Relatives can be people who live outside 
villages. Column 2 in Table 5 shows that 60 percent of the helpers mentioned are relatives of the 
                                                          
9
 The statistical summary is based on the number of rural households who have head and/or spouse were born in the 
same place where they are living.  
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respondents. The number of households who ask for the help from other members in the same 
village is even bigger with 72 per cent. 
 
The results on the share of helpers who are relatives are interesting. They show that households 
in the more developed provinces such as Ha Tay, Phu Tho or Long An are at least as likely as 
households in less developed provinces (for example, Lai Chau and Dak Nong) to mention 
relatives as their most important helpers. This similarity in level of family ties is a first indication 
of important trend: whereas economic development has tended to erode the relative economic 
importance of family ties in Western countries, this may not necessarily be happening in 
Vietnam. Similar conclusions are reached by Dalton et. al. (2002), who in a sample that includes 
both rural and urban dwellers find that the importance of family ties does not decline with 
socioeconomic status. In the language of social capital theory, Vietnamese families display high 
levels of “bonding” social capital, and this “traditional” form of social capital does not appear to 
be deteriorated by more modern types of social relations (CIEM et at, 2007).  
 
Climate Variables 
 
A. Rainfall and Temperature  
 
To measure climate variation, I restrict my attention to temperature and rainfall. These two 
variables have a considerable impact on wet-rice agriculture and other natural resource-
dependent activities, are highly correlated with other important factors such as storms, typhoon, 
cyclones and drought. Of course, these indicators do not represent a comprehensive catalog of 
the physical and biotic components of the Vietnamese habitat. However, they include main 
factors that empirically affect the natural adaptation and livelihood strategies of Vietnamese 
peasants throughout centuries. 
 
Data on climate variability from 46 climate stations comes from Institute of Meteorology and 
Hydrology and prolongs 35 – 50 years from 1927 to 1985. These stations are allocated evenly 
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among national geography.  For each station, I have climate data, such as precipitation, at station 
with latitude-longitude degree point p in district i during month m of year t . 
 
To compute the climate variation, I first calculate average of temperature and rainfall in each 
station for each month (month-specific average). I take average of weather over 35-50 years to 
reduce the effect of extreme weather condition in specific years. After that, I obtain the standard 
deviation of temperature and rainfall of each station over twelve months to investigate within 
year weather fluctuations. The idea behind this calculation is to see how the repeated weather 
variability within the year affects the demand for cooperation. For villages/communes with a 
great deal of weather variation throughout a year, farmers can predict these circumstances based 
on their own experience in the past and will ask a help from their neighbors in coping with these 
unpleasant conditions. If everyone in the same commune faces the same condition, everyone will 
cooperate. 
 
For districts without stations, the climate condition is assumed to be similar to other districts with 
the same latitude. The reason to apply this strategy is that stations are expected to gauge the 
significant climate variation in different regions. Therefore, climate data from one station can be 
used to measure neighboring districts with similar condition.  
 
B. Other geographical variables 
 
Other factors and geographical conditions may have impacts on the evolution of cooperation and 
the appearance of trust among village members. At the same time, they may correlate with 
climate variation. 
 
Average climate conditions  
 
Average climatic conditions are likely to have considerable impact on patterns of cooperative 
behavior. For example, even a region without much climate variation but low average rainfall or 
temperature within a year also makes people come up with differences of livelihood strategies. 
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To account for these effects, I control for the average level of temperature and rainfall at the 
district level. These measures are constructed from the same dataset described above, taking their 
average over twelve months and over the entire period. 
 
Elevation and Land Terrain 
 
Elevation and land terrain can have both direct and indirect effects on patterns of human 
interaction and on economic outcomes (Nunn and Puga, 2012). Land terrain and elevation can 
also be expected to be correlated with climate variability. For example, the presence of a 
mountain can lead to different climatic condition and micro-ecosystems on each side (Durante, 
2009). This requires village members to come up with different cooperative strategies. To 
control for the relationship between climate variability and topography, I include a plot dummy 
variable to measure of agricultural land terrain in regressions. The information for land terrain is 
withdrawn from the question to household heads on topography of household‟s land plot : “In 
general, what is the slope of this plot? Flat, Slight Slope, Moderate Slope and Steep Slope”. The 
measure of land slope takes the value of 1 if plots are flat and 0 otherwise. As presented in Table 
1, more than 50 percent of land plots are in slight to steep conditions. 
 
Land area and quality 
 
Diversification in land quality may have significant impacts on productivity and village 
members‟ motivation to cooperate in agricultural activities (Durante, 2009). To account for this 
aspect, I include area of land and dummy of land quality in regressions. Information on the land 
quality is taken from the question: “Do you experience problems with any of following conditions 
on this plot? Erosion, Dry land, Low-lying land, Sedimentation, Landslide, Stone soils/clay, 
other or No problem”. I construct a measure of land quality that takes on the value of 1 if 
households do not have any plots that suffer any above problems and 0 otherwise. Only two 
percent of households report high quantity of land without any above problems. 
 
C. Migration  
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Normally, we would like to know precisely when and where an individual move (from one 
district to other districts). This is because our analysis exploits geographic and environment 
variation to study their impacts on social trust. Migration is likely to make the regression 
coefficient biased in the way that people could be selective to choose living in one region rather 
than others and these people are likely to be more (or less) trusting people. 
 
The survey provides some useful information based on questions on how long households have 
lived in the commune and location that people born. I follow a strategy to take only households 
with head, spouse or both of them where they live are also where they were born. The argument 
here is the more time those people have been exposed in this environment, the more their norms 
adapt to this natural condition. In addition, if we expect that culture is resistant and transmitted 
through generations, people were born there also are likely to inherit trust form their ancestors 
who used to live in those settings. In Table 1, the average age of household heads who were born 
locally is 50 years old.  It implies that climate has long-lasting and profound effects on their 
living and behavior.  
 
In addition, other reasons that make migration less likely to be major issues. Since most of 
provinces are poor and underdeveloped, it first provides less incentive to people from one 
province in the sample migrate to others and second, also reduces the possibility that people from 
other provinces move to live in any provinces in the sample.  
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
A. OLS estimates 
 
I first investigate the relationship between climate variability and trust using historical climate 
data. To further test the robustness of the relationship between trust and historical climate 
variability, I extend the analysis to account for differential geographical and social network 
variables.  
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My empirical strategy can be summarized by the following estimating equation
10
: 
 
pdicdididppdi XVarEnvironTrust ,,
'
,
'
,,, _    
 
where αp denotes province fixed effects, which are included to capture provinces specific factors, 
such as effectiveness of local regulations and norms, that may affect trust. The variable pdiTrust ,,  
denotes measures of trust, which vary across households. dVarEnviron_  denotes the degree of  
variability for climate (temperature or rainfall) among districts. β is our coefficient of interest 
which estimates the relationship between the climate variation in a district and the individual‟s 
current level of trust. 
 
To assess the potential effects of climate variation on this social trust, it may necessary to 
examine whether these patterns vary systematically across demographic groups. For example, if 
there are systematic differences by income and education levels, then we might speculate that 
rising social status might shift patterns of social trust in predictable ways. Higher levels of 
income is expected to increase involvement in social networks; family activity is will be higher 
among the better educated, as well as participation in work and friendship networks. We also 
might hypothesize that younger Vietnamese might place less reliance on family ties, and be more 
integrated to work and friendship networks and less social trust. Occupation may be an important 
determinant of social trust in the sense that people who work in more competitive sectors have 
higher levels of trust (Francois et al, 2010). Similarly, we expect that farmers would follow more 
family-center patterns of social relations than urban workers. 
 
 The vector 
'
,, pdi  include information on household head, such as age, age squared/100, years of 
education, household income, a gender variable indicator, an indicator variable that equals one if 
the respondent lives in an urban location, a dummy variable for people who are ethnic minorities 
                                                          
10
Because the distribution of the rainfall and temperature are highly left skewed, with a small number of 
observations taking on large values, I report estimates using the natural log of the climate measures. 
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and sixty one occupational fixed effects. The vector 
'
,, pdi  consists of geographical and social 
network variables, such as average temperature and rainfall, land terrain and quality, set of 15 
group member indicators, an indicator of whether people always attend meeting. c is a variable 
designed to capture the share of the commune‟s population that is of the same ethnicity as the 
respondent.  
 
Many of the explanatory variables in above equation do not vary across individuals, rather at the 
commune level. For example, climate variation will have the similar effects for people living the 
same commune. Also the household survey uses stratified cluster sampling, there is a potential 
for within-group correlation of the residuals. Therefore, I adjust all standard errors for potentially 
arbitrary correlation between households in the same commune. 
 
Table 6 and 7 report the results using for log of rainfall and temperature variation. In baseline 
models, I find substantial evidence that climate variation, particularly temperature variability, is 
correlated with two self-reported trust indicators. In the most case, with and without provincial 
fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for temperature, β, is statistically significant (at the 5% 
level), indicating that climate variability positively affecting average trust score at household 
level. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the climate variation positively affects 
individuals‟ trust of those around them. However, the evidence is less robust for the case of 
rainfall variation. The relationship turns out to be insignificant with the first measure of trust but 
still significant for the second as I control for provincial fixed effects. 
 
Realizing the potential problem is that climate variation may pick up the effects of other 
geographical variables, in Table 8, I include the vector of geographic controls, which includes 
average temperature and rainfall, land area, land terrain and quality. When the geographical 
controls are included, the point estimates of the coefficients of interest increase substantially and 
become highly statistically significant. For the magnitude of the coefficient, holding other 
variables constant, one standard deviation increase in log of rainfall variation corresponds to a 
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.05 increase in probability of trust other people (approximately 18 percent standard deviation in 
trust)
11
.  
 
I perform a variety of robustness checks for the results. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find 
evidence in the US that when respondents are part of an ethnic minority they exhibit low trust. 
However, religious belief and ethnic origin does not affect trust. In other studies, some authors 
argue that religion can affect trust directly, especially within religious communities, by 
promoting it via ritual (Iannaccone, 1998) or indirectly through psychological effects (Tan and 
Vogel, 2005). They find that trustworthiness increases with religiosity and more religious 
trustees are trustworthier. Participation in associations is also mater because it can affect social 
trust through repeated interactions. In addition, participation in social groups can enhance trust as 
social networks of the form created by social groups provide a mechanism to enforce agreements 
among network members (Kandori 1992; Mobius and Szeidl 2007). Putnam (2000) shows how 
changes in work, family structure, age, suburban life, television, computers and women's roles 
have contributed to the decline in stock of social capital. Olken (2009) also finds that the more 
village members spend on watching television and listening to the radio, the less they participate 
in social organizations and lower they self-report trust
12
. To take into account of these factors, I 
control for hours of watching TV and add dummy variables to indicate whether people belong to 
social and religious groups and how frequent they attend meetings. The results suggest that 
social network variables such as always attend meeting and hours watching TV do not show 
significant effects on social trust. 
 
I undertake a number of other sensitivity checks. First, I separately investigate the impacts of 
climate variation for each gender group of population. The results are more robust to the male 
subsample. I find that temperature variation (last Column in Table 10 and 11) has higher impacts 
on female; however, the results are not obvious for rainfall variation. Second, I check for 
robustness to alternative estimation methods. Using a logit model produces estimates that are 
                                                          
11
 The effect is calculated as (0.17 x 0.27)/0.26=0.18 
12 To save space, I do not report the coefficient estimates of the control variables throughout the paper. 
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qualitatively identical to our baseline OLS estimates (Appendix II). Third, I alternatively exclude 
different regions to see the impacts of other potential geographical factors, such as landlocked or 
near big rivers can make the results change significantly. The results in Table 12 and 13 indicate 
that the estimates are quite stable over a range of regression, except the impact of rainfall 
variable after excluding Northwest and Red River Delta regions. A plausible interpretation is that 
the impacts of climate variation are more profound in Northern areas. 
 
B. Possible endogeneity problems 
 
The use of a rich set of individual characteristics and district controls, and the fact that the 
climate volatility measures predate the outcomes, reduce concerns about omitted variable bias 
and endogeneity. However, it is important to admit that I cannot definitively exclude the 
possibility that some unobserved district characteristic affects both climate variation and social 
trust, leading to spurious results. In addition, other problems also may create biased estimation. 
 
The first is OLS estimator would yield biased estimates since our measurement error from 
measure of climate variation, i.e. rainfall and temperature, would be correlated with the error 
term in the social trust equation. This problem results in an attenuation bias in the estimated 
climate variation on social trust. 
 
Another problem that may affect the estimates is selection bias. The problem happens as a non-
random subgroup of village peasants select to stay in regions even with more natural risks. The 
reason may be due to constrained resources that make them less opportunity to move to other 
regions with better natural environments. People with less ability are also likely to choose not 
moving out of harmful areas. These groups of people are likely to have different patterns of 
social trust. I assume that these village peasants have less interaction with outside society and 
less trust other people, then the measurement error in self-reported trust, to whatever reasons, 
may correlate with the climate variation term in the right hand side. Another selection problem 
can be raised due to unobservable individual characteristics. Some groups of village peasants are 
likely to be more risk-averse or less motivation and tend to stay at the same place where they 
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were born even those places are not favorable for living. Cameron and Shah (2011)  and Cassar 
et al (2011) show that people living in villages that have suffered a natural disaster behave a 
more risk averse than others. If risk-averse people are less trusting others and these factors 
correlate with climate variability among district, then the estimates are also to be underestimated. 
If so, the results provide lower bound estimation. 
 
C. Sensitivity Test for Unobservable Bias 
 
 
As mentioned above, although I try to control for observable factors, such as individual controls 
and other geographical variables, the estimates reported in Table 8 and 9 may still be biased by 
unobservable factors correlated with selection into the climate variations and social trust.  
 
In this part, I assess the likelihood that the estimates are biased by unobservables. I follow the 
approach initiated by Altonji et al. (2005) and Bellows and Miguel (2008) that selection on 
observables can be used to assess the potential bias from unobservables. Their ideas are to 
measure the strength of the likely bias arising from unobservables. In another word, how much 
higher selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, must be to explain away 
the full estimated effect (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Specifically, to gauge this bias, the ratio 
of the estimated coefficient for the variable of interest from the unrestricted regression over the 
difference between the estimated coefficient for the variable of interest from the restricted and 
unrestricted regression is calculated. Then, the higher this ratio, the greater is the effect that 
needs to be explained away by selection on unobservables. 
 
I consider two sets of restricted control variables: one with average rainfall and temperature 
controls and another with a group of individual controls that includes only age, age squared, and 
married, gender and average rainfall and temperature variables. I also consider two sets of full 
covariates: the baseline group of controls from equation Table 8, and a second with geographic 
and social network control variables in Table 9. 
 
 22 
 
Given our two restricted and two unrestricted sets of covariates, there are four combinations of 
restricted and unrestricted controls that can be used to calculate the ratios. The ratios, for each of 
two measures of trust, are reported in Appendix II.3. 
 
Of the sixteen ratios are reported in Appendix II.3, none are less than one. The ratios range from 
10.29 to 183.75, with a median ratio of 22.96. Therefore, to make the entire OLS estimate to be 
from selection effects, selection on unobservables would have to be ten times greater than 
selection on observables, and on average, over 23 times greater. In my view, these results make it 
less likely that the estimated effect of the rainfall variation is completely driven by 
unobservables. 
 
D. Exploration of Mechanisms 
 
To test the empirical validity of my theoretical channels, I now look at the relationship between 
climate volatility and the importance of the family and relationship among village members, 
replicating the analysis performed in the previous section. 
 
Subsistence peasants often lack savings to self-insure themselves against adverse income shocks. 
In addition, they are likely to suffer credit-constrain since the high transaction costs of providing 
small credit prevent credit organizations from entering the market. Therefore, through social 
networks, they can access an important source of small credit that helps to improve efficient risk-
sharing within the community.  
 
The hypothesis here is that in the process of environmental adaptation, village peasants have to 
cooperate with each other to deal with natural turbulences and disasters. On the one hand, this 
promotes trust and social networks among members in the village. Therefore, village peasants 
rely more on other members in the facing of emergency. On the other hand, social networks also 
strengthen trust between peasants because they allow their members to get more information 
about each other through repeated interaction. This allows potential lenders to identify reliable 
borrowers. Social networks enable lenders to control the actions of borrowers to some degree 
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and, for example, discourage excessively risky investments through a system of punishments and 
rewards. I will investigate a channel through which climate variation will enhance the 
relationship among communal members. I expect that districts with high level of climate 
variation make lenders more willing to provide loans to other members of the community. At the 
same time, borrowers also are likely to ask for more help from neighbors, regardless of whether 
they are close family members. This channel is described in the graph below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 14, I examine the effects of the frequency of climate varibility on enhancing 
cooperation and relationship among neighbours. All regressions include both provincial fixed 
effects and geographical controls. In column 1, I start regressing the first village ties on 
variability in rainfall. The coefficient on rainfall variability is positive and statistically 
significant. Because the question about asking for help does not mention specific reasons for 
borrowing money, the results are likely to be contaminated by other factors beyond climate 
variation. To check sensitivity of this possibility, I gradually exclude some regions in the South 
with less climate variation to figure out the effects more precisely. Column (2)-(5) indicate that 
climate variation strengthens relationship among village members. 
 
In addition, in order to investigate the impacts of income sources on cooperation, I decompose 
household income into different components: incomes from agricultural and common resource 
activities and incomes from non-farm activities. If main source of income of village peasants 
from agricultural and related activities, I expect that people with higher share of agricultural 
incomes will ask for help from other village members more. 
 
The results show incomes from agricultural and common resource activities have a significantly 
positive effect on villagers‟ relationship. The coefficients in Column 1 to 5 are highly significant 
Environmental  
Adaptation 
Cooperation to cope 
with risks and 
uncertainties 
Asking for 
money help in 
the case of 
emergency 
Social trust 
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and quite are stable across models. The point estimate indicates that one percentage increase in 
agricultural income increase the probability of cooperation (asking for help) to village neighbors 
from 0.09 to 0.15. The effects of share of income from common-resource activities are even 
more profound, ranging from 0.17 to 0.4.  
 
I also test the possibility that increased relying on other people in the same villages will reduce 
the family ties. Empirical evidence has suggested that these two objects are negatively 
correlated. Using survey data from multiple sources Alesina and Giuliano (2010) find that 
individuals with strong family ties display lower levels of generalized trust, civic engagement 
and political participation. Durante (2009) discovers that climate adaptation has tended to erode 
the relative importance of family ties in Western countries. 
 
Table 15 reports regression results for the effects of the frequency of climate variation on family 
ties. Family ties are proxied by the whether village members ask their relatives for money in case 
of emergency. In column 1, I start by estimating the first family ties on variability in rainfall. The 
coefficient on rainfall variability is positive, showing that climate variation enhance family 
relationship but not statistically insignificant. Following the above strategy, I exclude regions 
with less climate variation, such as Mekong River Delta, to figure out more precisely the effects. 
The result from Column 2 to 5 indicate the same pattern, climate variation does not erode family 
and relative ties. In other words, this shows that people living in unfavorable conditions still rely 
on family and relatives in the case of assistance. These results contradict with other studies that 
family ties tend to be deteriorated as people are more generalized trust. However, this may not 
necessarily be happening in Vietnam. Similar conclusions are reached by Dalton et. al. (2002) 
who in a sample that includes both rural and urban dwellers finds that the importance of family 
ties does not decline with socioeconomic status. Vietnamese families display high levels of 
“bonding” social capital, and this “traditional” form of social capital has not been weaken due to 
an appearance of  modern types of social relations. One possible explanation of this pattern is the 
continued importance of Confucian values, along with living in difficult environments, which 
tend to strengthen family relations.  
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I continue the investigation of mechanism by decomposing the total income by household in 
farming and non-farming sources. I expect that people in household with higher share of income 
from farming activities will expose higher social trust to other people. Table 16 report OLS 
regressions for the impact of share of household incomes from farming activities. In column (1) 
and (3) regressions, the coefficients of share of incomes from agricultural activities are positive 
and significant effects on social trust. In other words, as household incomes are rely more on 
agricultural activities, people tend to be more cooperative and trust other people more. This is 
very much consistent with our story. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite its importance to economic development, the economic sources of social trust remain 
relatively unexplored. This paper adds to a new and growing literature in economics that seeks to 
better understand the role of climate variation on cooperation and social trust of village peasants.  
 
I have shown that the levels of trust among village peasants can be traced back to the effects of 
historical climate variation. Individuals‟ trust in their neighbors is higher if their livings were 
heavily affected by the natural disasters. To check the robustness of this causal relationship, I 
pursue a number of different strategies. First, I control for potential observable characteristics, 
including geographical and social network variables, which may correlate with natural 
environment and affects social trust. Second, I control for provincial fixed effects that are 
expected to wipe out confounding effect caused by invariant unobserved variables. In general, 
the estimates show a positive effect of social trust on mutual assistance within village members. 
Third, using recently developed techniques from Altonji et al. (2005), I showed that on average 
selection based on unobservable variables would have to be 33 times greater than selection on 
observables in order for the effect of the rainfall and temperature variation on social trust to be 
completely spurious. 
 
I further examine the relationship between climatic variability and individuals‟ behavior to their 
family. Contrary with recent studies documenting the existence of a negative empirical 
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relationship between trust within and outside the family, I find that higher variability in climate 
does not significantly impacts on family ties.  
 
I then turned to specific mechanisms and examined two explanations for the relationship 
between the climate variation and trust. I found that people living in more climate variation tend 
to ask for the help from their neighbors in the case of emergency, which enhance mutual trust 
among them. In addition, I realized that households who rely more on agricultural incomes tend 
to trust other people more. The explanation is that the living that heavily relies on natural 
environment resulted in continuing cooperation and promoting social networks, and higher trust. 
The findings provide another evidence for the importance of natural environment to economic 
development through the evolution of cultural norms. 
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Appendix I 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Most people can be trusted 2228 0.93 0.26 0 1 
Careful in dealing with people 1853 0.68 0.47 0 1 
      Log Rainfall variation (mm) 2326 4.86 0.17 4.57 5.71 
Log Temperature variation (oC) 2326 0.59 0.48 -0.12 1.61 
Average Rainfall 12 months (mm) 2326 151.59 38.83 113.24 320.07 
Average Temperature 12 months (oC) 2326 24.30 2.41 18.31 27.36 
      Age of head 2358 49.35 14.44 18 96 
Age of head, squared/100 2358 26.44 15.69 3.24 92.16 
Year of schooling of head 2358 8.11 3.66 1 13 
Gender (Male:=1) 2358 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Married 2358 0.85 0.35 0 1 
Rural 2358 0.99 0.09 0 1 
Minority 2358 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Log Household income (mil VND) 2358 3.18 0.86 -0.12 7.02 
      Area of land (1000m2) 2358 8.86 20.77 0.04 830.42 
Land terrain (Flat:=1) 2358 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Land Quality (Good:=1) 2358 0.02 0.12 0 1 
      Member of social and religious groups 1841 5.15 3.91 1 15 
Attend meeting frequently 1841 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Hours of watching TV 2358 1.41 1.00 0 5 
Share of minority by district 2358 0.38 0.47 0 1 
      Borrowing from same village 2073 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Borrowing from relatives 2073 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Note: The summary statistics are calculated based on VARHS survey data. 
Table 2. Bivariate correlation 
 Most people 
can be trusted 
Careful in dealing 
with people 
Log Rainfall  
Variation 
Log Temperature 
Variation 
Most people can be trusted 1    
Careful in dealing with people -0.166* 1   
Log Rainfall  Variation 0.119* -0.170* 1  
Log Temperature Variation 0.145* -0.115* 0.140* 1 
Note: * Statistically significant at 5 percent. 
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 Figure 1. Map showing the current locations of respondents 
 
 
 34 
 
Table 3. Climate variation summary (Standard Deviation) 
Province Station Period Rainfall Temperature Province Station Period Rainfall Temperature 
HaTay Son Tay 1958-85 123.72 4.80 DienBien Tua Chua 1968-85 134.40 3.59 
 
Ba Vi 1970-85 147.43 4.89 
 
Tuan Giao 1961-85 111.30 4.06 
 
Ha Dong 1973-85 97.54 4.99 
 
Pha Din 1964-85 126.44 3.35 
 
Xuan Mai 1961-85 130.51 
  
Dien Bien 1967-85 120.76 3.91 
 
My Duc 1962-85 126.82 4.73 Nghe An Quy Chau 1962-85 122.17 4.24 
LaoCai Muong Khuong 1961-78 128.85 4.78 
 
Quy Hop 1968-85 111.23 4.35 
 
Bac Ha 1961-85 122.96 4.83 
 
Tay Hieu 1960-85 116.39 4.48 
 
Lao Cai 1989-1950; 56-78 112.28 4.49 
 
Tuong Duong 1961-85 84.73 4.00 
 
Sa Pa 1929-45; 57-85 158.27 4.21 
 
Quynh Luu 1961-85 137.96 4.60 
Phu Tho Phu Ho 1928-43; 62-85 122.68 4.75 
 
Con Cuong 1961-85 116.69 4.33 
 
Viet Tri 1961-85 109.81 4.83 
 
Do Luong 1961-85 121.01 4.37 
 
Thanh Son 1971-81 109.79 4.64 
 
Hon Ngu 1961-85 170.76 4.67 
 
Minh Dai 1972-85 105.61 4.75 
 
Vinh 1904-46; 56-85 148.36 4.53 
Lai Chau Phong Tho 1961-78 152.11 4.15 Quang Nam Tam Ky 1979-85 236.43 2.85 
 
Tam Duong 1973-85 178.01 3.79 
 
Tra My 1974; 78-85 303.17 2.55 
 
Muong Te 1961-85 208.08 3.80 Khanh Hoa Nha Trang 1907-44; 47-85 120.87 1.79 
 
Sin Ho 1961-85 200.84 3.84 
 
Cam Ranh 1978-85 117.12 1.76 
 
Binh Lu 1968-81 180.89 4.04 
 
Truong Sa 1977-85 135.54 0.96 
 
Lai Chau 1928-44;55-85 159.77 3.73 Dac Lac Buon Ho 1982-1985 101.70 1.92 
Dac Nong Dac Nong 1978-85 164.84 1.27 
 
Buon Ma Thuot 1828-44; 54-74; 78-85 118.17 1.61 
Lam Dong Da Lat 1928-44; 60-69; 78-85 99.98 1.06 
 
M Drack 1977-85 157.39 2.26 
 
Bao Loc 1962-85 135.32 1.06 Long An Moc Hoa 1973-85 96.80 0.88 
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Table 4. Overview of the responses to trust question (percentage) 
Provinces Most people can be trusted Careful in dealing with people 
 
Yes No Yes No 
Ha Tay 91.73 8.27 79.94 20.06 
Lao Cai 98 2 40.63 59.38 
Phu Tho 95.17 4.83 97.47 2.53 
Lai Chau 94.12 5.88 15.25 84.75 
Dien Bien 82.78 17.22 86.14 13.86 
Nghe An 96.55 3.45 78.95 21.05 
Quang Nam 97.98 2.02 76.24 23.76 
Lam Dong 94 6 16 84 
Dac Lac 93.33 6.67 74.32 25.68 
Dac Nong 95.77 4.23 73.33 26.67 
Khanh Hoa 92.59 7.41 85.71 14.29 
Long An 81.65 18.35 84.31 15.69 
 
  
  
Total 92.55 7.45 67.73 32.37 
Note: The summary statistics are calculated based on VARHS survey data 
 
Table 5. Overview of the asking for help in the case of emergency (percentage) 
Provinces Borrowing from relatives Borrowing from village members 
 
Yes No Yes No 
Ha Tay 
68.66 31.34 71.89 28.11 
Lao Cai 
61.5 38.5 86.1 13.9 
Phu Tho 
55.69 44.31 67.48 32.52 
Lai Chau 
66.29 33.71 91.67 8.33 
Dien Bien 
80.62 19.38 79.84 20.16 
Nghe An 
53.74 46.26 48.98 51.02 
Quang Nam 
43.02 56.98 67.05 32.95 
Lam Dong 
82.69 17.31 71.15 28.85 
Dac Lac 
40 60 68 32 
Dac Nong 
56.72 43.28 71.64 28.36 
Khanh Hoa 
40.74 59.26 70.37 29.63 
Long An 
57.53 42.47 59.82 40.18 
   
  
Total 60.06 39.94 71.97 28.23 
Note: The summary statistics are calculated based on VARHS survey data
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Table 6. Baseline estimations. Rainfall variation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Most people can be trusted 
Careful in dealing with 
people 
          
Log Rainfall variation (100mm) 0.171*** 0.0575 -0.331** -0.274** 
 
(0.0472) (0.0559) (0.144) (0.109) 
Minority -0.0185 -0.0110 -0.247*** -0.0189 
 
(0.0191) (0.0198) (0.0519) (0.0491) 
Age of head -0.00280 -0.00316 0.00498 0.00274 
 
(0.00298) (0.00301) (0.00616) (0.00441) 
Age of head, square/100 0.00285 0.00312 -0.00389 -0.00185 
 
(0.00260) (0.00262) (0.00546) (0.00405) 
Rural 0.133** 0.0864 0.121 0.0761 
 
(0.0559) (0.0582) (0.0984) (0.0997) 
Year of schooling of head 0.00114 0.000921 0.00141 0.00342 
 
(0.00157) (0.00149) (0.00331) (0.00295) 
Male -0.00652 -0.00874 -0.0403 -0.0601 
 
(0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0401) (0.0388) 
Married 0.0323 0.0248 0.00978 0.0290 
 
(0.0269) (0.0265) (0.0394) (0.0362) 
Log Household income -0.0168** -0.00932 0.0361** 0.0248* 
 
(0.00836) (0.00871) (0.0165) (0.0138) 
Occupational fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Provincial fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 2,197 2,197 1,827 1,827 
Number of commune clusters 413 413 387 387 
R-squared 0.021 0.096 0.12 0.38 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 7. Baseline estimations. Temperature variation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Most people can be 
trusted 
Careful in dealing with 
people 
          
Log Temperature variation (oC) 0.0755*** 0.0523*** -0.0593 -0.107*** 
 
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0550) (0.0413) 
Minority -0.0229 -0.00204 -0.250*** -0.0369 
 
(0.0188) (0.0206) (0.0554) (0.0470) 
Age of head -0.00210 -0.00290 0.00352 0.00234 
 
(0.00308) (0.00302) (0.00654) (0.00462) 
Age of head, square/100 0.00223 0.00287 -0.00253 -0.00135 
 
(0.00267) (0.00262) (0.00576) (0.00423) 
Rural 0.141*** 0.0932 0.0861 0.0653 
 
(0.0480) (0.0572) (0.0884) (0.105) 
Year of schooling of head 0.000855 0.000748 0.00189 0.00404 
 
(0.00157) (0.00150) (0.00347) (0.00311) 
Male 0.00599 -0.000905 -0.0553 -0.0784** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0394) (0.0371) 
Married  0.0263 0.0207 0.0129 0.0391 
 
(0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0394) (0.0346) 
Household Income (mil.) -0.0171* -0.00877 0.0416*** 0.0248* 
 
(0.00883) (0.00875) (0.0160) (0.0137) 
Occupational fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Provincial fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 2,197 2,197 1,827 1,827 
Number of commune clusters 413 413 387 387 
R-squared 0.029 0.1 0.11 0.38 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 8. Climate variation and social trust. Adding geographic variables 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall Variation  Log Temperature Variation 
          
Climate variation 0.266*** -0.689**  0.0596*** -0.143*** 
 
(0.0981) (0.267)  (0.0162) (0.0435) 
Minority 0.00193 -0.0333  0.000308 -0.0203 
 
(0.0213) (0.0507)  (0.0216) (0.0497) 
Age of head -0.00303 0.00218  -0.00309 0.00234 
 
(0.00295) (0.00445)  (0.00298) (0.00449) 
Age of head, square/100 0.00301 -0.00145  0.00304 -0.00152 
 
(0.00257) (0.00408)  (0.00259) (0.00411) 
Rural 0.0856 0.0850  0.0958* 0.0590 
 
(0.0588) (0.0966)  (0.0577) (0.112) 
Year of schooling of head 0.000826 0.00382  0.000841 0.00377 
 
(0.00151) (0.00304)  (0.00151) (0.00308) 
Gender (Male:=1) -0.00859 -0.0625  -0.00260 -0.0740** 
 
(0.0218) (0.0388)  (0.0221) (0.0368) 
Married 0.0232 0.0308  0.0207 0.0350 
 
(0.0266) (0.0359)  (0.0268) (0.0347) 
Log Household income  -0.00903 0.0237*  -0.00878 0.0234* 
 
(0.00856) (0.0138)  (0.00863) (0.0135) 
Average Rainfall (mm) -0.0014*** 0.00294*  0.000305 -0.00147 
 
(0.000539) (0.00164)  (0.000343) (0.00105) 
Average Temperature (oC) -0.0145** 0.0309  0.00269 -0.0116 
 
(0.00642) (0.0194)  (0.00624) (0.0179) 
Area of Land (1000m2) 0.000189 -0.000418  0.000190 -0.000427* 
 
(0.000234) (0.000253)  (0.000232) (0.000256) 
Land terrain (Flat:=1) 0.0230 0.0318  0.0217 0.0372 
 
(0.0147) (0.0295)  (0.0149) (0.0290) 
Land quality 0.0267 -0.0186  0.0249 -0.0133 
 
(0.0465) (0.0968)  (0.0464) (0.0996) 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,197 2,197  1,827 1,827 
Number of commune 
clusters 413 413  387 387 
R-squared 0.101 0.384  0.102 0.385 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
 
 
 
 
 39 
 
Table 9. Climate variation and social trust. Adding other social network variables 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall Variation  Log Temperature Variation 
          
Climate variation 0.231** -0.621**  0.0586*** -0.117*** 
 
(0.103) (0.258)  (0.0165) (0.0400) 
Minority -0.115 0.00594  -0.116 0.0161 
 
(0.0867) (0.110)  (0.0880) (0.109) 
Age of head -0.00130 0.00155  -0.00130 0.00151 
 
(0.00386) (0.00530)  (0.00387) (0.00529) 
Age of head, square/100 0.00139 -0.00133  0.00142 -0.00136 
 
(0.00330) (0.00489)  (0.00331) (0.00488) 
Rural 0.0585 0.0726  0.0699 0.0482 
 
(0.0745) (0.111)  (0.0754) (0.124) 
Year of schooling of head 0.000892 0.00123  0.000895 0.00105 
 
(0.00139) (0.00383)  (0.00141) (0.00385) 
Gender (Male:=1) -0.0206 -0.0646  -0.0121 -0.0792** 
 
(0.0229) (0.0398)  (0.0231) (0.0373) 
Married 0.0417 0.0372  0.0378 0.0432 
 
(0.0310) (0.0411)  (0.0311) (0.0394) 
Log Household income  -0.00716 0.0159  -0.00747 0.0175 
 
(0.00945) (0.0159)  (0.00948) (0.0157) 
Average Rainfall (mm) -0.00140** 0.00337**  0.000183 -0.000495 
 
(0.000583) (0.00163)  (0.000355) (0.000895) 
Average Temperature (oC) -0.0134* 0.0340*  0.00251 -0.00223 
 
(0.00682) (0.0194)  (0.00617) (0.0162) 
Area of Land (1000m2) 0.000360 -0.000606**  0.000366 -0.000628** 
 
(0.000296) (0.000283)  (0.000296) (0.000293) 
Land terrain (Flat:=1) 0.0309* 0.0226  0.0300 0.0268 
 
(0.0186) (0.0342)  (0.0186) (0.0343) 
Land quality 0.00462 0.0187  0.00103 0.0285 
 
(0.0538) (0.120)  (0.0537) (0.123) 
Always attending meeting -0.0111 0.00414  -0.0108 0.00552 
 
(0.00778) (0.0130)  (0.00769) (0.0127) 
Hours watching TV 0.0163 -0.0304  0.0160 -0.0288 
 
(0.0179) (0.0327)  (0.0177) (0.0326) 
Share of minority at commune 0.151 -0.0625  0.151 -0.0554 
 
(0.0957) (0.129)  (0.0961) (0.130) 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,745 1,437  1,745 1,437 
Number of commune clusters 387 361  387 361 
R-squared 0.154 0.371  0.157 0.372 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 10. Climate variation and social trust by female  
  Female 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (oC) 
          
Climate variation 0.242 -0.670  0.0555 -0.187*** 
 
(0.227) (0.470)  (0.0408) (0.0708) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographical control Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 287 230  287 230 
Number of commune clusters 163 135  163 135 
R-squared 0.35 0.41  0.355 0.43 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
 
Table 11. Climate variation and social trust by male 
  Male 
VARIABLES Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (oC) 
          
Climate variation 0.207** -0.516*  0.0476*** -0.0955** 
 
(0.104) (0.270)  (0.0168) (0.0467) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographical controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,458 1,207  1,458 1,207 
Number of commune  clusters 363 326  363 326 
R-squared 0.157 0.38  0.158 0.38 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 12. Climate variation and social trust by regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent variable: Most people can be trusted 
VARIABLES 
Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (100mm) 
  
          
Climate variation  0.300** 0.226** 0.213** 0.279* 0.129  0.072*** 0.0602*** 0.052*** 0.0526** 0.0561*** 
 
(0.130) (0.105) (0.104) (0.163) (0.124)  (0.0209) (0.0160) (0.0169) (0.0259) (0.0173) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,505 1,618 1,605 1,011 1,241  1,505 1,618 1,605 1,011 1,241 
Number of commune clusters 344 347 333 213 311  344 347 333 213 311 
R-square 0.153 0.128 0.163 0.228 0.165  0.155 0.132 0.164 0.228 0.170 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round 
brackets.  
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Table 13. Climate variation and social trust by regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent variable: Careful in dealing with people 
VARIABLES 
Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded 
MRD 
Excluded 
CH 
Excluded 
RRD 
Excluded 
NW 
 
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  Log Temperature variation (100mm) 
  
          
Climate variation  -0.737*** -0.824*** -0.612** -0.139 -0.402  -0.166*** -0.0668* -0.124*** -0.108 -0.117*** 
 
(0.280) (0.245) (0.261) (0.374) (0.319)  (0.0408) (0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0664) (0.0409) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,261 1,301 1,317 882 987  1,261 1,301 1,317 882 987 
Number of commune clusters 322 307 322 207 286  322 307 322 207 286 
R-square 0.404 0.380 0.373 0.370 0.250  0.408 0.370 0.375 0.373 0.258 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round 
brackets.  
  
 43 
 
Table 14. Identifying impact channels: Village relationship 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dependent Variable: Borrowing from neighbors 
VARIABLES 
Full 
sample 
Excluded 
SCC 
Excluded  
MRD and SCC 
Excluded  
SCC and CH 
Excluded  
SCC, CH, MRD 
  Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  0.327* 0.548*** 0.559*** 0.580*** 0.581*** 
 
(0.174) (0.180) (0.183) (0.180) (0.183) 
Share of Agricultural income 0.110** 0.102** 0.144*** 0.0964* 0.145** 
 
(0.0443) (0.0490) (0.0520) (0.0526) (0.0570) 
Share of income from common resources 0.395*** 0.297** 0.266* 0.325** 0.303** 
 
(0.104) (0.124) (0.138) (0.131) (0.146) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,621 1,373 1,233 1,246 1,106 
Number of commune clusters 384 341 287 301 247 
R-square 0.125 0.142 0.150 0.155 0.165 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
 
Table 15. Identifying impact channels: Family ties 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dependent Variable: Borrowing from relatives 
VARIABLES 
Full 
sample 
Same 
village 
Exclude 
SCC 
Excluded  
MRD and SCC 
Excluded  
CH and SCC 
  
    
Log Rainfall variation (100mm)  0.337 0.322 0.330 0.322 0.310 
 
(0.230) (0.240) (0.270) (0.234) (0.240) 
Share of Agricultural income -0.0653 -0.0266 -0.0686 -0.0519 -0.0734 
 
(0.0500) (0.0590) (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0527) 
Share of income from common resources -0.158 -0.0865 -0.0837 -0.147 -0.149 
 
(0.129) (0.152) (0.155) (0.136) (0.132) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,621 1,165 1,373 1,494 1,481 
Number of commune clusters 384 335 341 344 330 
R-square 0.122 0.162 0.114 0.131 0.128 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided  
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Table 16. Identifying impact channels: Agricultural incomes 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation   Log Temperature variation  
          
Climate variation 0.233** -0.630**  0.0610*** -0.120*** 
 
(0.103) (0.259)  (0.0163) (0.0411) 
Share of Agricultural 
income 0.0736** -0.0429 
 
0.0770*** -0.0511 
 
(0.0292) (0.0432)  (0.0292) (0.0446) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,745 1,437  1,745 1,437 
Number of commune 
clusters 387 361 
 
387 361 
R-squared 0.159 0.371  0.162 0.372 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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Appendix II 
1. Social Trust and Climate variation. Rainfall and Temperature regression 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Rainfall variation   Temperature variation 
          
Climate variation 0.0014** -0.003*  0.024*** -0.05*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.002)  (0.007) (0.016) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupational fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,745 1,437  1,745 1,437 
Number of commune 
clusters 387 361 
 
387 361 
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.16  0.4 0.4 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
 
2. Social Trust and Climate variation. Logistic regression 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Log Rainfall variation   Log Temperature variation 
          
Climate variation 5.816 -4.392**  1.694*** -0.764*** 
 
(2.186) (1.728)  (0.437) (0.255) 
Individual controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Group member fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,665 1,430  1,665 1,430 
Number of commune 
clusters 380 361 
 
380 361 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.29  0.17 0.29 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in round brackets.  
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3. Using selection on observables to assess the bias from unobservables 
  
 
(1) (2)  (1) (2) 
  
Log Rainfall variation  Log Temperature Variation 
Controls in the restricted regression Controls in the full regression 
Trust 
people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
 
Trust people 
Careful dealing 
with people 
             
Average Rainfall and Temperature Full set of controls from Table 8 26.39 14.93  80.56 82.33 
Average Rainfall and Temperature Full set of controls from Table 9  28.66 22.24  13.8 10.29 
Average Rainfall and Temp, Age, 
Age square/100, Gender, Married Full set of controls from Table 8 37.01 16.01 
 
183.75 169.73 
Average Rainfall and Temp, Age, 
Age square/100, Gender, Married Full set of controls from Table 9  20.79 23.68 
 
11.54 14.41 
Notes: Each cell of the table reports ratios based on the coefficient for log rainfall and temperature variation from household-level regressions. In 
each regression, provincial fixed effects are included. The reported ratio is calculated as: the coefficient for log climate variation in full 
regression/(the coefficient for climate variation in restricted regression - the coefficient for climate variation in full regression)
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Appendix III. Theoretical model 
To facilitate this research, I develop a simple game to demonstrate a mechanism through which 
climate variation is likely to change behavior of village peasants and create social trust. 
Suppose a communal economy is closed, cohesive, agrarian economy consisting of small 
villages. Each village includes a group of mainly subsistence household-farmers. Suppose the 
most important factor influencing village life is the risk to crop yields resulted from climatic 
conditions, such as flooding or drought. As risk is prevalent and critical to village near to 
subsistence, much effort will be taken to mitigate uncertainty.  
 
Large-scale constructions, such as dykes and irrigation systems, have to be built to ease the 
impacts of hazard environment. A group of villages are responsible to build and maintain the 
systems of flood control in their territory. The system of flood control is considered a public 
good to sustain development of villages. It is costly to provide but once it is provided it is not 
possible to exclude using it regardless of how much villages contributed for this good. The 
impossibility to exclude individual from its use encourage each individual to free-ride on the 
contributions of the other. 
  
Consider a strategic game of two players – two villages. Each player has two strategies: 1) either 
Cooperate or 2) Don‟t Cooperate. I assume that none of the players has perfect information on 
the other‟s payoffs.  
 
Figure 1 displays a normal-form representation of the game with payoff for each player in 
parentheses.  
 
  Village B 
 
  Cooperate Don‟t Cooperate 
Village A 
Cooperate (a,b) (c,d) 
Don‟t Cooperate (e,f) (g,h) 
 
Assumption 1: High social uncertainty reduces the opportunity of cooperation among villages  
 
I assume that society is uncertain. Peasants face informational asymmetry as they deal with other 
people in other villages. If peasants of villages are not able to solve efficiently cooperation 
dilemmas because of high cost of supervision - they cannot monitor other's behavior and punish 
other village who „free ride‟- they choose non-cooperation.  
 
Assumption 2: Cooperation among villages requires transaction cost 
 
As creating social relations take time and effort, people have to invest their resources in 
promotion of relationship and communication with members of other villages. Transaction cost 
will be high if any villages refuse to cooperate. 
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Assumption 3: Cooperation promotes social trust 
 
To exploit opportunities that are not satisfied by working alone, villages select to cooperate with 
other villages. It makes them taking more risks in trusting other members. Moreover, as Ermisch 
and Gambetta (2010) suggest, interacting more with other peoples can lead to more “outward 
exposure”, and improve their ability to trust other people by (1) estimating more accurately the 
probability of trustworthiness; or (2) reading the signs of untrustworthiness more precisely. 
Therefore, peasants cooperate and interact less with other people will exhibit a lower level of 
trust in members of other villages. 
 
The expected net benefit as peasants switching from non-cooperation to cooperation with 
members of other villages is: 
 
switchB = {Payoff of cooperation (CV) – Social Uncertainty – Transaction cost} - Payoff of non-
cooperation (CV) 
 
where payoff of cooperation or non-cooperation is assumed as a function of climate variation 
(CV). Assumption is where natural environment is difficult for living, benefits of cooperation are 
high. Village peasants are more cooperative to cope with risks and uncertainty. Higher climate 
variation also reduces payoff of non-cooperation. It means: 
 
0
_



CV
ncooperatioPayoff
; 0
__



CV
ncooperationonPayoff
 
 
I investigate the best response strategies of both players 
 
At first, I assume that the natural environment is hazardous that require mutual effort to cope 
with disasters. Then, if village A chooses to cooperate with village B, the best response of B is to 
cooperate with A. In term of payoff, b>d.  
 
If member A chooses not to cooperate, the best response of B is to cooperate. In case of 
dangerous natural environment, B decides to work alone to protect her own benefit even she does 
not receive support from A ( switchB >0)
13
. In term of payoff, f>h 
 
Similarly, if B has the same preferences then the game that models the situation is given in 
Figure 2 with the best response choices of the two players are indicated by the underlined 
payoffs. We come up with one Nash equilibrium to the game with strategy of Cooperation is 
dominant.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 Instead of one-shot game, suppose the game is repeatedly played (infinitely) with grim trigger strategy and 
villages appreciate sufficiently the benefits of future cooperation, which mean gains from cheating today is less than 
discounted net gain from cooperation in the future (Payoff of both Cooperate (Promise of future reward) – Payoff of 
both Non-cooperate (Threat of future punishment)) then B still chooses Cooperate even if f<h in the one-shot game. 
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  Village B 
 
  Cooperate  Don‟t Cooperate 
Village A 
Cooperate (a,b) (c,d) 
Don‟t Cooperate (e,f) (g,h) 
 
Assumption of risky natural environment to village peasants that promote cooperation among 
villages (and more social trust among villages) lead to an equilibrium, which is (Cooperate, 
Cooperate).    
 
Does it potentially be a stable Nash equilibrium? It depends on the benefit of cooperation. 
 
If the natural environment is not a big concern that requires a mutual cooperation within village 
members, the benefit of cooperation is diminishing. If the net benefit of cooperation is not as 
large as gains from non-cooperation (Payoff of cooperation (CV) – Social Uncertainty – 
Transaction Cost < Payoff of non-cooperation (CV) or switchB < 0), village peasants choose not 
to cooperate. For example, if the increment in payoff value is not worth the extra effort, B opts to 
not cooperate as A cooperates. In other words, the strategy to seek harmony and efficient 
cooperation is a good strategy insofar as opportunity costs are big enough to exceed savings from 
transaction cost and benefits of working alone. 
 
If one player chooses not to cooperate, the prevailing equilibrium breaks down. In this case, the 
Nash equilibrium is (Don‟t Cooperate; Don‟t Cooperate) 
 
  Village B 
 
  Cooperate Don‟t Cooperate 
Village A 
Cooperate  (a,b) (c,d) 
Don‟t Cooperate (e,f) (g,h) 
 
A benign natural environment, which does not require much mutual efforts and cooperation to 
cope with, encourages villages to work alone and do not make effort to build relationship and 
cooperation. Therefore, it is expected that people living in regions with less dangerous 
environment will show lower level of social trust. 
 
